

1 Andrew G. Gunem (SBN 354042)
andrewg@straussborrelli.com
2 STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
One Magnificent Mile
3 980 N. Michigan Avenue, Ste. 1610
Chicago, IL 60611
4 Telephone: (872) 263-1100
5 Facsimile: (872) 263-1109

6 *Attorneys for Plaintiff and Proposed Class*

7
8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9 **EASTERN DIVISION**

10 **SAUNDRA SONNIER**, on behalf of
herself and all others similarly situated,

11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

13 **TOSHIBA AMERICA BUSINESS**
14 **SOLUTIONS, INC.**,

15 Defendant.
16
17
18
19

Case No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1. Negligence
2. Negligence *per se*
3. Breach of Implied Contract
4. Invasion of Privacy
5. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
6. Violation of the California
Unfair Competition Law
7. Violation of the California
Consumer Privacy Act
8. Declaratory Judgement

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 Saundra Sonnier (“Plaintiff”), through her attorneys, individually and on behalf of
2 all others similarly situated, brings this Class Action Complaint against Defendant
3 Toshiba American Business Solutions, Inc. (“Toshiba” or “Defendant”), and its
4 present, former, or future direct and indirect parent companies, subsidiaries,
5 affiliates, agents, and/or other related entities. Plaintiff alleges the following on
6 information and belief—except as to her own actions, counsel’s investigations, and
7 facts of public record.

8 NATURE OF ACTION

9 1. This class action arises from Defendant’s failure to protect highly
10 sensitive data.

11 2. Toshiba America Business Solutions is a subsidiary of the Japanese
12 technology company Toshiba and “provides copiers, printers, managed document
13 services and digital signage for businesses throughout the United States, Mexico,
14 and Central and South America.”¹ Defendant boasts an annual revenue of \$1.1
15 billion.²

16 3. Upon information and belief, Defendant stores a litany of highly
17 sensitive personal identifiable information (“PII”) about its current and former
18 employees.

19 4. Upon information and belief, on or around December 4, 2023,
20

21 ¹ *Toshiba Business About*, LinkedIn,
22 <https://www.linkedin.com/company/toshibabusiness/> (last visited June 3, 2024).

23 ² *Toshiba America Business Solutions Revenue*, Zippia,
24 <https://www.zippia.com/toshiba-america-business-solutions-careers-41976/revenue/> (last visited June 3, 2024).

1 Defendant lost control over that data when cybercriminals infiltrated its
2 insufficiently protected computer systems in a data breach (the “Data Breach”).³
3 After discovering the breach, Toshiba did not immediately notify its employees that
4 hackers had breached its systems. Instead, Defendant then waited until May 28,
5 2024, before it began to notify victims of the breach—almost six months after the
6 breach occurred.

7 5. When Toshiba finally disclosed the Data Breach to victims in May
8 2024, its Breach Notice obfuscated the nature of the breach and the threat it posed—
9 refusing to tell its victims how many people were impacted, how the breach
10 happened on Toshiba’s systems, when the breach first occurred, when Toshiba
11 discovered the Data Breach, or why it took Toshiba close to six months to begin
12 notifying victims that hackers had gained access to highly sensitive PII. *See* Notice
13 of Data Breach sent to Plaintiff (Exhibit A).

14 6. Cybercriminals bypassed Toshiba’s security systems and accessed
15 employee data, meaning Defendant had no effective means to prevent, detect, stop,
16 or mitigate breaches of its systems—thereby allowing cybercriminals unrestricted
17 access to its current and former employees’ PII.

18 7. On information and belief, cybercriminals were able to breach
19 Defendant’s systems because Defendant failed to adequately train its employees on
20 cybersecurity and failed to maintain reasonable security safeguards or protocols to
21

22 ³ Data Breach Notifications, Maine Office of the Attorney General,
23 <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aeviewer/ME/40/401acca4-7cb4-4d16-899b-82b4fabe9bf6.shtml>, (last visited June 3, 2024).

1 protect the Class's PII. In short, Defendant's failures placed the Class's PII in a
2 vulnerable position—rendering them easy targets for cybercriminals.

3 8. Plaintiff is a Data Breach victim. She brings this class action on behalf
4 of herself, and all others harmed by Defendant's misconduct.

5 9. The exposure of one's PII to cybercriminals is a bell that cannot be
6 unrung. Before this data breach, Defendant's current and former employees' private
7 information was exactly that—private. Not anymore. Now, their private information
8 is forever exposed and unsecure.

9 **PARTIES**

10 10. Plaintiff, Saundra Sonnier, is a natural person and citizen of California.
11 She resides in San Clemente, California where she intends to remain.

12 11. Defendant, Toshiba America Business Solutions, Inc., is a corporation
13 incorporated in California and with its principal place of business at 25530
14 Commercentre Drive, Lake Forest, California 92630.

15 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

16 12. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under the
17 Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The amount in controversy
18 exceeds \$5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, there are more than 100 members
19 in the proposed class, and at least one member of the class is a citizen of a state
20 different from Defendant.

21 13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it is
22 headquartered in this District and does substantial business in California.

23 14. Venue is proper in this Court because Defendant's principal office is in
24

1 this District, and because a substantial part of the events, acts, and omissions giving
2 rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

3 BACKGROUND

4 *Defendant Collected and Stored the PII of Plaintiff and the Class*

5 15. Defendant is a subsidiary of the Japanese technology company Toshiba
6 and "provides copiers, printers, managed document services and digital signage for
7 businesses throughout the United States, Mexico, and Central and South America."⁴
8 Defendant boasts an annual revenue of \$1.1 billion.⁵

9 16. As part of its business, Defendant receives and maintains the PII of
10 thousands of its current and former employees.

11 17. After all, Defendant declares in its Employee Privacy Policy ("Privacy
12 Policy") that it "collect[s] personal information directly from you in circumstances
13 where you provide personal information (e.g., during the job application and hiring
14 process)."⁶

15 18. Defendant's Privacy Policy declares [a]ny job applicants or prospective
16 employees that TOSHIBA chooses to employ will be subject to our Employee
17

18
19 ⁴ *Toshiba Business About*, LinkedIn,
<https://www.linkedin.com/company/toshibabusiness/> (last visited June 3, 2024).

20 ⁵ Toshiba America Business Solutions Revenue, Zippia,
[https://www.zippia.com/toshiba-america-business-solutions-careers-
21 41976/revenue/](https://www.zippia.com/toshiba-america-business-solutions-careers-41976/revenue/) (last visited June 3, 2024).

22 ⁶ Employee Privacy Notice, Toshiba,
[https://careers.business.toshiba.com/en/employee-privacy-
23 policy#:~:text=Personal%20information%20does%20not%20include,job%20appli-
24 cation%20and%20hiring%20process](https://careers.business.toshiba.com/en/employee-privacy-policy#:~:text=Personal%20information%20does%20not%20include,job%20application%20and%20hiring%20process) (last visited June 3, 2024).

1 Privacy Notice.”⁷

2 19. Defendant’s Privacy Policy states, “in the course of providing
3 administrative employment services, including processing job applications, we may
4 collect the following specific pieces of personal information from you:

- 5 a. Name, email address, gender, home address and telephone number;
6 b. Residency and work permit status, military and veteran status,
7 disability status, ethnicity and nationality;
8 c. ...other information you provide to us in support of an application
9 and/or the application and recruitment process.”⁸

10 20. In collecting and maintaining the PII, Defendant agreed it would
11 safeguard the data in accordance with its internal policies, state law, and federal law.
12 After all, Plaintiff and Class members themselves took reasonable steps to secure
13 their PII.

14 21. Under state and federal law, businesses like Defendant have duties to
15 protect its current and former employees’ PII and to notify them about breaches.

16 22. Defendant acknowledges these duties in its Privacy Policy, stating that
17 it “recognizes the confidential nature of the personal information in its care and is
18 accountable for the compliance of itself and its directors, officers, management,
19 employees, representatives, and agents in protecting this personal information”⁹ and
20 that it has “implemented technical and organizational security measures to provide

21
22 ⁷ *Id.*

23 ⁸ *Id.*

24 ⁹ *Id.*

reasonable security for your Personal Information.”¹⁰

Defendant’s Data Breach

23. Upon information and belief, on or around December 4, 2023, Defendant lost control over that data when cybercriminals infiltrated its insufficiently protected computer systems in the Data Breach.¹¹

24. Defendant has an ongoing internal investigation into the nature and scope of the breach. Ex. A.

25. Defendant’s investigation has carried on for almost six months while its employees were unaware that hackers had accessed their highly sensitive PII.

26. On May 28, 2024, six months after the incident, Defendant finally began notifying victims of the Data Breach.¹²

27. And when Defendant did notify Plaintiff and the Class of the Data Breach, Defendant acknowledged that the Data Breach created a present, continuing, and significant risk of suffering identity theft, warning Plaintiff and the Class to “be vigilant for incidents of fraud or identity theft by reviewing your account statements and free credit reports for any unauthorized activity.” Ex. A.

28. Defendant explained that it identified “suspicious activity within [its] email environment” and that certain personal information “was potentially

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ Data Breach Notifications, Maine Office of the Attorney General, <https://apps.web.maine.gov/online/aeviewer/ME/40/401acca4-7cb4-4d16-899b-82b4fabe9bf6.shtml>, (last visited June 3, 2024).

¹² *Id.*

1 viewed by an unauthorized individual.” Ex. A.

2 29. On information and belief, because of Defendant’s Data Breach, at
3 least the names and Social Security numbers of victims were compromised.

4 30. The number of individuals injured by the Breach is unknown due to the
5 obfuscating nature of Defendant’s Breach Notice. Upon information and belief, the
6 impacted persons include Defendant’s current and former employees. Ex. A.

7 31. And yet, Defendant waited six months to provide notice to the Data
8 Breach victims. Thus, Defendant kept the Class in the dark—thereby depriving the
9 Class of the opportunity to try and mitigate their injuries in a timely manner.

10 32. Defendant failed its duties when its inadequate security practices
11 caused the Data Breach. In other words, Defendant’s negligence is evidenced by its
12 failure to prevent the Data Breach and stop cybercriminals from accessing the PII.
13 And thus, Defendant caused widespread injury and monetary damages.

14 33. On information and belief, Defendant failed to adequately train its
15 employees on reasonable cybersecurity protocols or implement reasonable security
16 measures.

17 34. Defendant has done little to remedy its Data Breach. True, Defendant
18 has offered victims credit monitoring and identity related services. But upon
19 information and belief, such services are wholly insufficient to compensate Plaintiff
20 and Class members for the injuries that Defendant inflicted upon them.

21 35. Since the breach, Defendant “implemented additional measures to
22 enhance the security of [its] email environment.” But this is too little too late. Simply
23 put, these measures—which Defendant now recognizes as necessary—should have

1 been implemented before the Data Breach.

2 36. Because of Defendant’s Data Breach, the sensitive PII of Plaintiff and
3 Class members was placed into the hands of cybercriminals—inflicting numerous
4 injuries and significant damages upon Plaintiff and Class members.

5 37. Upon information and belief, the cybercriminals in question are
6 particularly sophisticated. After all, cybercriminals defeated the relevant data
7 security systems and gained actual access to sensitive data.

8 38. And as the Harvard Business Review notes, such “[c]ybercriminals
9 frequently use the Dark Web—a hub of criminal and illicit activity—to sell data
10 from companies that they have gained unauthorized access to through credential
11 stuffing attacks, phishing attacks, [or] hacking.”¹³

12 39. Thus, on information and belief, Plaintiff’s and the Class’s stolen PII
13 has already been published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals
14 on the Dark Web.

15 ***Plaintiff’s Experiences and Injuries***

16 40. Plaintiff Sandra Sonnier is a former employee of Defendant—having
17 worked for Defendant between April 2022 and May 2024.

18 41. Thus, Defendant obtained and maintained Plaintiff’s PII.

19 42. As a result, Plaintiff was injured by Defendant’s Data Breach.

20 43. As a condition of employment with Toshiba, employees were required

21 ¹³ Brenda R. Sharton, *Your Company’s Data Is for Sale on the Dark Web. Should*
22 *You Buy It Back?*, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Jan. 4, 2023)
23 [https://hbr.org/2023/01/your-companys-data-is-for-sale-on-the-dark-web-should-](https://hbr.org/2023/01/your-companys-data-is-for-sale-on-the-dark-web-should-you-buy-it-back)
24 [you-buy-it-back](https://hbr.org/2023/01/your-companys-data-is-for-sale-on-the-dark-web-should-you-buy-it-back).

1 to disclose their PII to Defendant, including but not limited to, their names and Social
2 Security numbers. Defendant used that PII to facilitate employment of Plaintiff,
3 including payroll, and required Plaintiff to provide that PII to obtain employment
4 and payment for that employment.

5 44. Plaintiff provided her PII to Defendant and trusted the company would
6 use reasonable measures to protect it according to Defendant's internal policies, as
7 well as state and federal law. Defendant obtained and continues to maintain
8 Plaintiff's PII and has a continuing legal duty and obligation to protect that PII from
9 unauthorized access and disclosure.

10 45. Plaintiff reasonably understood that a portion of the funds from her
11 employment would be used to pay for adequate cybersecurity and protection of PII.

12 46. Plaintiff does not recall ever learning that her information was
13 compromised in a data breach incident—other than the breach at issue here.

14 47. On information and belief, Plaintiff's PII has already been published—
15 or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals on the Dark Web.

16 48. Thus, upon information and belief, through its Data Breach, Defendant
17 compromised Plaintiff's name and Social Security number.

18 49. Plaintiff has spent—and will continue to spend—significant time and
19 effort monitoring her accounts to protect herself from identity theft. After all,
20 Defendant directed Plaintiff to take those steps in its breach notice.

21 50. And in the aftermath of the Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered from a
22 dramatic spike in phishing emails, including fraudulent emails regarding PayPal
23 payments.

51. Plaintiff has also experienced fraudulent emails requesting that she verify her identity for tax purposes.

52. Plaintiff fears for her personal financial security and worries about what information was exposed in the Data Breach.

53. Because of Defendant's Data Breach, Plaintiff has suffered—and will continue to suffer from—anxiety, sleep disruption, stress, fear, and frustration. Such injuries go far beyond allegations of mere worry or inconvenience. Rather, Plaintiff's injuries are precisely the type of injuries that the law contemplates and addresses.

54. Plaintiff suffered actual injury from the exposure and theft of her PII—which violates her rights to privacy.

55. Plaintiff suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of her PII. After all, PII is a form of intangible property—property that Defendant was required to adequately protect.

56. Plaintiff suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the substantially increased risk of fraud, misuse, and identity theft—all because Defendant’s Data Breach placed Plaintiff’s PII right in the hands of criminals.

57. Because of the Data Breach, Plaintiff anticipates spending considerable amounts of time and money to try and mitigate her injuries.

58. Today, Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that her PII—which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant’s possession—is protected and safeguarded from additional breaches.

Plaintiff and the Proposed Class Face Significant Risk of Continued Identity Theft

59. Because of Defendant’s failure to prevent the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members suffered—and will continue to suffer—damages. These damages include, *inter alia*, monetary losses, lost time, anxiety, and emotional distress. Also, they suffered or are at an increased risk of suffering:

- a. loss of the opportunity to control how their PII is used;
- b. diminution in value of their PII;
- c. compromise and continuing publication of their PII;
- d. out-of-pocket costs from trying to prevent, detect, and recovery from identity theft and fraud;
- e. lost opportunity costs and wages from spending time trying to mitigate the fallout of the Data Breach by, *inter alia*, preventing, detecting, contesting, and recovering from identify theft and fraud;
- f. delay in receipt of tax refund monies;
- g. unauthorized use of their stolen PII; and
- h. continued risk to their PII—which remains in Defendant’s possession—and is thus as risk for futures breaches so long as Defendant fails to take appropriate measures to protect the PII.

60. Stolen PII is one of the most valuable commodities on the criminal information black market. According to Experian, a credit-monitoring service, stolen PII can be worth up to \$1,000.00 depending on the type of information obtained.

61. The value of Plaintiff and Class's PII on the black market is considerable. Stolen PII trades on the black market for years. And criminals

1 frequently post and sell stolen information openly and directly on the “Dark Web”—
2 further exposing the information.

3 62. It can take victims years to discover such identity theft and fraud. This
4 gives criminals plenty of time to sell the PII far and wide.

5 63. One way that criminals profit from stolen PII is by creating
6 comprehensive dossiers on individuals called “Fullz” packages. These dossiers are
7 both shockingly accurate and comprehensive. Criminals create them by cross-
8 referencing and combining two sources of data—first the stolen PII, and second,
9 unregulated data found elsewhere on the internet (like phone numbers, emails,
10 addresses, etc.).

11 64. The development of “Fullz” packages means that the PII exposed in the
12 Data Breach can easily be linked to data of Plaintiff and the Class that is available
13 on the internet.

14 65. In other words, even if certain information such as emails, phone
15 numbers, or credit card numbers may not be included in the PII stolen by the cyber-
16 criminals in the Data Breach, criminals can easily create a Fullz package and sell it
17 at a higher price to unscrupulous operators and criminals (such as illegal and scam
18 telemarketers) over and over. That is exactly what is happening to Plaintiff and Class
19 members, and it is reasonable for any trier of fact, including this Court or a jury, to
20 find that Plaintiff and other Class members’ stolen PII is being misused, and that
21 such misuse is fairly traceable to the Data Breach.

22 66. Defendant disclosed the PII of Plaintiff and Class members for
23 criminals to use in the conduct of criminal activity. Specifically, Defendant opened
24

up, disclosed, and exposed the PII of Plaintiff and Class members to people engaged in disruptive and unlawful business practices and tactics, including online account hacking, unauthorized use of financial accounts, and fraudulent attempts to open unauthorized financial accounts (i.e., identity fraud), all using the stolen PII.

67. Defendant’s failure to promptly and properly notify Plaintiff and Class members of the Data Breach exacerbated Plaintiff and Class members’ injury by depriving them of the earliest ability to take appropriate measures to protect their PII and take other necessary steps to mitigate the harm caused by the Data Breach.

Defendant Knew—Or Should Have Known—of the Risk of a Data Breach

68. Defendant’s data security obligations were particularly important given the substantial increase in cyberattacks and/or data breaches in recent years.

69. In 2021, a record 1,862 data breaches occurred, exposing approximately 293,927,708 sensitive records—a 68% increase from 2020.¹⁴

70. Indeed, cyberattacks have become so notorious that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and U.S. Secret Service issue warnings to potential targets, so they are aware of, and prepared for, a potential attack. As one report explained, “[e]ntities like smaller municipalities and hospitals are attractive to ransomware criminals . . . because they often have lesser IT defenses and a high incentive to regain access to their data quickly.”¹⁵

¹⁴ See 2021 Data Breach Annual Report, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 2022) <https://www.idtheftcenter.org/post/identity-theft-resource-center-2021-annual-data-breach-report-sets-new-record-for-number-of-compromises/> (last visited June 3, 2024).

¹⁵ Ben Kochman, *FBI, Secret Service Warn of Targeted Ransomware*, LAW360

71. Therefore, the increase in such attacks, and attendant risk of future attacks, was widely known to the public and to anyone in Defendant’s industry, including Defendant.

Defendant Failed to Follow FTC Guidelines

72. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making. Thus, the FTC issued numerous guidelines identifying best data security practices that businesses—like Defendant—should use to protect against unlawful data exposure.

73. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*. There, the FTC set guidelines for what data security principles and practices businesses must use.¹⁶ The FTC declared that, *inter alia*, businesses must:

- a. protect the personal customer information that they keep;
- b. properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed;
- c. encrypt information stored on computer networks;
- d. understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and
- e. implement policies to correct security problems.

74. The guidelines also recommend that businesses watch for the

(Nov. 18, 2019), <https://www.law360.com/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware> (last visited June 3, 2024).

¹⁶ *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 2016) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf (last visited June 3, 2024).

1 transmission of large amounts of data out of the system—and then have a response
2 plan ready for such a breach.

3 75. Furthermore, the FTC explains that companies must:

- 4 a. not maintain information longer than is needed to authorize a
5 transaction;
- 6 b. limit access to sensitive data;
- 7 c. require complex passwords to be used on networks;
- 8 d. use industry-tested methods for security;
- 9 e. monitor for suspicious activity on the network; and
- 10 f. verify that third-party service providers use reasonable security
11 measures.

12 76. The FTC brings enforcement actions against businesses for failing to
13 protect consumer data adequately and reasonably. Thus, the FTC treats the failure—
14 to use reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to
15 confidential consumer data—as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of
16 the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from
17 these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data
18 security obligations.

19 77. In short, Defendant’s failure to use reasonable and appropriate
20 measures to protect against unauthorized access to its current and former employees’
21 data constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTCA, 15
22 U.S.C. § 45.

23 ***Defendant Failed to Follow Industry Standards***

1 78. Several best practices have been identified that—at a *minimum*—
2 should be implemented by businesses like Defendant. These industry standards
3 include: educating all employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security, including
4 firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-malware software; encryption (making data
5 unreadable without a key); multi-factor authentication; backup data; and limiting
6 which employees can access sensitive data.

7 79. Other industry standard best practices include: installing appropriate
8 malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network ports; protecting
9 web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such as
10 firewalls, switches, and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security
11 systems; protection against any possible communication system; and training staff
12 regarding critical points.

13 80. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the
14 following frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including
15 without limitation PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7,
16 PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7,
17 DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the Center for Internet Security's Critical Security
18 Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards in reasonable cybersecurity
19 readiness.

20 81. These frameworks are applicable and accepted industry standards. And
21 by failing to comply with these accepted standards, Defendant opened the door to
22 the criminals—thereby causing the Data Breach.

23 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

1 82. Plaintiff brings this class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2),
2 and 23(b)(3), individually and on behalf of all members of the following class:

3 All individuals residing in the United States whose PII was
4 compromised in the Data Breach disclosed by Toshiba in
5 May 2024, including all those who received notice of the
6 breach.

7 83. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its agents, affiliates, parents,
8 subsidiaries, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, any Defendant
9 officer or director, any successor or assign, and any Judge who adjudicates this case,
10 including their staff and immediate family.

11 84. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition.

12 85. Certification of Plaintiff's claims for class-wide treatment is
13 appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on class-wide
14 bases using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in
15 individual actions asserting the same claims.

16 86. Ascertainability. All members of the proposed Class are readily
17 ascertainable from information in Defendant's custody and control. After all,
18 Defendant already identified some individuals and sent them data breach notices.

19 87. Numerosity. The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all
20 Class members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the proposed Class
21 consists of thousands of current and former employees.

22 88. Typicality. Plaintiff's claims are typical of Class members' claims as
23 each arises from the same Data Breach, the same alleged violations by Defendant,
24 and the same unreasonable manner of notifying individuals about the Data Breach.

89. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the proposed Class's common interests. Her interests do not conflict with Class members' interests. And Plaintiff has retained counsel—including lead counsel—that is experienced in complex class action litigation and data privacy to prosecute this action on the Class's behalf.

90. Commonality and Predominance. Plaintiff's and the Class's claims raise predominantly common fact and legal questions—which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members—for which a class wide proceeding can answer for all Class members. In fact, a class wide proceeding is necessary to answer the following questions:

- a. if Defendant had a duty to use reasonable care in safeguarding Plaintiff's and the Class's PII;
- b. if Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- c. if Defendant were negligent in maintaining, protecting, and securing PII;
- d. if Defendant breached contract promises to safeguard Plaintiff and the Class's PII;
- e. if Defendant took reasonable measures to determine the extent of the Data Breach after discovering it;
- f. if Defendant's Breach Notice was reasonable;
- g. if the Data Breach caused Plaintiff and the Class injuries;

1 h. what the proper damages measure is; and

2 i. if Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages, treble damages,
3 and or injunctive relief.

4 91. Superiority. A class action will provide substantial benefits and is
5 superior to all other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this
6 controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by individual Class
7 members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that individual
8 litigation against Defendant would require. Thus, it would be practically impossible
9 for Class members, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for their
10 injuries. Not only would individualized litigation increase the delay and expense to
11 all parties and the courts, but individualized litigation would also create the danger
12 of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. By
13 contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues
14 in a single proceeding, ensures economies of scale, provides comprehensive
15 supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties.

16 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**
17 **Negligence**
18 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

19 92. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
20 forth herein.

21 93. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their PII to Defendant on the premise
22 and with the understanding that Defendant would safeguard their PII, use their PII
23 for business purposes only, and/or not disclose their PII to unauthorized third parties.

1 94. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class members because
2 it was foreseeable that Defendant's failure—to use adequate data security in
3 accordance with industry standards for data security—would compromise their PII
4 in a data breach. And here, that foreseeable danger came to pass.

5 95. Defendant has full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types
6 of harm that Plaintiff and the Class could and would suffer if their PII was
7 wrongfully disclosed.

8 96. Defendant owed these duties to Plaintiff and Class members because
9 they are members of a well-defined, foreseeable, and probable class of individuals
10 whom Defendant knew or should have known would suffer injury-in-fact from
11 Defendant's inadequate security practices. After all, Defendant actively sought and
12 obtained Plaintiff and Class members' PII.

13 97. Defendant owed—to Plaintiff and Class members—at least the
14 following duties to:

- 15 a. exercise reasonable care in handling and using the PII in its care
16 and custody;
- 17 b. implement industry-standard security procedures sufficient to
18 reasonably protect the information from a data breach, theft, and
19 unauthorized;
- 20 c. promptly detect attempts at unauthorized access;
- 21 d. notify Plaintiff and Class members within a reasonable
22 timeframe of any breach to the security of their PII.

23 98. Thus, Defendant owed a duty to timely and accurately disclose to
24

1 Plaintiff and Class members the scope, nature, and occurrence of the Data Breach.
2 After all, this duty is required and necessary for Plaintiff and Class members to take
3 appropriate measures to protect their PII, to be vigilant in the face of an increased
4 risk of harm, and to take other necessary steps to mitigate the harm caused by the
5 Data Breach.

6 99. Defendant also had a duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse
7 practices to remove PII it was no longer required to retain under applicable
8 regulations.

9 100. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the failure to
10 exercise due care in the collecting, storing, and using of the PII of Plaintiff and the
11 Class involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff and the Class, even if the
12 harm occurred through the criminal acts of a third party.

13 101. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures arose because of
14 the special relationship that existed between Defendant and Plaintiff and the Class.
15 That special relationship arose because Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant
16 with their confidential PII, a necessary part of obtaining services from Defendant.

17 102. The risk that unauthorized persons would attempt to gain access to the
18 PII and misuse it was foreseeable. Given that Defendant holds vast amounts of PII,
19 it was inevitable that unauthorized individuals would attempt to access Defendant's
20 databases containing the PII—whether by malware or otherwise.

21 103. PII is highly valuable, and Defendant knew, or should have known, the
22 risk in obtaining, using, handling, emailing, and storing the PII of Plaintiff and Class
23 members' and the importance of exercising reasonable care in handling it.

1 110. As a direct and traceable result of Defendant's negligence and/or
2 negligent supervision, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered or will suffer
3 damages, including monetary damages, increased risk of future harm,
4 embarrassment, humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress.

5 111. And, on information and belief, Plaintiff's PII has already been
6 published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals on the Dark Web.

7 112. Defendant's breach of its common-law duties to exercise reasonable
8 care and its failures and negligence actually and proximately caused Plaintiff and
9 Class members actual, tangible, injury-in-fact and damages, including, without
10 limitation, the theft of their PII by criminals, improper disclosure of their PII, lost
11 benefit of their bargain, lost value of their PII, and lost time and money incurred to
12 mitigate and remediate the effects of the Data Breach that resulted from and were
13 caused by Defendant's negligence, which injury-in-fact and damages are ongoing,
14 imminent, immediate, and which they continue to face.

15 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**
16 **Negligence *per se***
17 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

18 113. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
19 forth herein.

20 114. Under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, Defendant had a duty to use fair
21 and adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff's
22 and Class members' PII.

23 115. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting
24

1 commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or
2 practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to
3 protect the PII entrusted to it. The FTC publications and orders promulgated
4 pursuant to the FTC Act also form part of the basis of Defendant’s duty to protect
5 Plaintiff and the Class members’ sensitive PII.

6 116. Defendant breached its respective duties to Plaintiff and Class members
7 under the FTC Act by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer
8 systems and data security practices to safeguard PII.

9 117. Defendant violated its duty under Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing
10 to use reasonable measures to protect PII and not complying with applicable industry
11 standards as described in detail herein. Defendant’s conduct was particularly
12 unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII Defendant had collected and stored
13 and the foreseeable consequences of a data breach, including, specifically, the
14 immense damages that would result to individuals in the event of a breach, which
15 ultimately came to pass.

16 118. The harm that has occurred is the type of harm the FTC Act is intended
17 to guard against. Indeed, the FTC has pursued numerous enforcement actions against
18 businesses that, because of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures
19 and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by
20 Plaintiff and members of the Class.

21 119. But for Defendant’s wrongful and negligent breach of its duties owed,
22 Plaintiff and Class members would not have been injured.

23 120. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and Class members was the
24

1 reasonably foreseeable result of Defendant's breach of their duties. Defendant knew
2 or should have known that Defendant was failing to meet its duties and that its breach
3 would cause Plaintiff and members of the Class to suffer the foreseeable harms
4 associated with the exposure of their PII.

5 121. Defendant's various violations and its failure to comply with applicable
6 laws and regulations constitutes negligence *per se*.

7 122. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence *per se*,
8 Plaintiff and Class members have suffered and will continue to suffer numerous
9 injuries (as detailed *supra*).

10 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**
11 **Breach of Implied Contract**
12 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

13 123. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
14 forth herein.

15 124. Plaintiff and Class members were required to provide their PII to
16 Defendant as a condition of receiving employment provided by Defendant. Plaintiff
17 and Class members provided their PII to Defendant or its third-party agents in
18 exchange for Defendant's employment.

19 125. Plaintiff and Class members reasonably understood that a portion of the
20 funds from their employment would be used to pay for adequate cybersecurity
21 measures.

22 126. Plaintiff and Class members reasonably understood that Defendant
23 would use adequate cybersecurity measures to protect the PII that they were required
24

1 to provide based on Defendant's duties under state and federal law and its internal
2 policies.

3 127. Plaintiff and the Class members accepted Defendant's offers by
4 disclosing their PII to Defendant or its third-party agents in exchange for services
5 and/or products.

6 128. In turn, and through internal policies, Defendant agreed to protect and
7 not disclose the PII to unauthorized persons.

8 129. In its Privacy Policy, Defendant represented that they had a legal duty
9 to protect Plaintiff's and Class Member's PII.

10 130. Implicit in the parties' agreement was that Defendant would provide
11 Plaintiff and Class members with prompt and adequate notice of all unauthorized
12 access and/or theft of their PII.

13 131. After all, Plaintiff and Class members would not have entrusted their
14 PII to Defendant in the absence of such an agreement with Defendant.

15 132. Plaintiff and the Class fully performed their obligations under the
16 implied contracts with Defendant.

17 133. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an element of every
18 contract. Thus, parties must act with honesty in fact in the conduct or transactions
19 concerned. Good faith and fair dealing, in connection with executing contracts and
20 discharging performance and other duties according to their terms, means preserving
21 the spirit—and not merely the letter—of the bargain. In short, the parties to a contract
22 are mutually obligated to comply with the substance of their contract in addition to
23 its form.

134. Subterfuge and evasion violate the duty of good faith in performance even when an actor believes their conduct to be justified. Bad faith may be overt or consist of inaction. And fair dealing may require more than honesty.

135. Defendant materially breached the contracts it entered with Plaintiff and Class members by:

- a. failing to safeguard their information;
- b. failing to notify them promptly of the intrusion into its computer systems that compromised such information;
- c. failing to comply with industry standards;
- d. failing to comply with the legal obligations necessarily incorporated into the agreements; and
- e. failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the electronic PII that Defendant created, received, maintained, and transmitted.

136. In these and other ways, Defendant violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing.

137. Defendant's material breaches were the direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's and Class members' injuries (as detailed *supra*).

138. And, on information and belief, Plaintiff's PII has already been published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals on the Dark Web.

139. Plaintiff and Class members performed as required under the relevant agreements, or such performance was waived by Defendant's conduct.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Invasion of Privacy
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

140. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

141. Plaintiff and the Class had a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding their highly sensitive and confidential PII and were accordingly entitled to the protection of this information against disclosure to unauthorized third parties.

142. Defendant owed a duty to its current and former employees, including Plaintiff and the Class, to keep this information confidential.

143. The unauthorized acquisition (i.e., theft) by a third party of Plaintiff and Class members' PII is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

144. The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and entitled to be private. Plaintiff and the Class disclosed their sensitive and confidential information to Defendant, but did so privately, with the intention that their information would be kept confidential and protected from unauthorized disclosure. Plaintiff and the Class were reasonable in their belief that such information would be kept private and would not be disclosed without their authorization.

145. The Data Breach constitutes an intentional interference with Plaintiff's and the Class's interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to their person or as to their private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

146. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when it permitted the Data Breach because it knew its information security practices were inadequate.

1 147. Defendant acted with a knowing state of mind when it failed to notify
2 Plaintiff and the Class in a timely fashion about the Data Breach, thereby materially
3 impairing their mitigation efforts.

4 148. Acting with knowledge, Defendant had notice and knew that its
5 inadequate cybersecurity practices would cause injury to Plaintiff and the Class.

6 149. As a proximate result of Defendant's acts and omissions, the private
7 and sensitive PII of Plaintiff and the Class were stolen by a third party and is now
8 available for disclosure and redisclosure without authorization, causing Plaintiff and
9 the Class to suffer damages (as detailed *supra*).

10 150. And, on information and belief, Plaintiff's PII has already been
11 published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals on the Dark Web.

12 151. Unless and until enjoined and restrained by order of this Court,
13 Defendant's wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to
14 Plaintiff and the Class since their PII are still maintained by Defendant with their
15 inadequate cybersecurity system and policies.

16 152. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries
17 relating to Defendant's continued possession of their sensitive and confidential
18 records. A judgment for monetary damages will not end Defendant's inability to
19 safeguard the PII of Plaintiff and the Class.

20 153. In addition to injunctive relief, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the
21 other Class members, also seeks compensatory damages for Defendant's invasion of
22 privacy, which includes the value of the privacy interest invaded by Defendant, the
23 costs of future monitoring of their credit history for identity theft and fraud, plus
24

1 prejudgment interest and costs.

2 **FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
3 **Breach of Fiduciary Duty**
4 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

5 154. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
6 forth herein.

7 155. Given the relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff and Class
8 members, where Defendant became guardian of Plaintiff's and Class members' PII,
9 Defendant became a fiduciary by its undertaking and guardianship of the PII, to act
10 primarily for Plaintiff and Class members, (1) for the safeguarding of Plaintiff and
11 Class members' PII; (2) to timely notify Plaintiff and Class members of a Data
12 Breach and disclosure; and (3) to maintain complete and accurate records of what
13 information (and where) Defendant did and does store.

14 156. Defendant has a fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of Plaintiff and
15 Class members upon matters within the scope of Defendant's relationship with
16 them—especially to secure their PII.

17 157. Because of the highly sensitive nature of the PII, Plaintiff and Class
18 members would not have entrusted Defendant, or anyone in Defendant's position,
19 to retain their PII had they known the reality of Defendant's inadequate data security
20 practices.

21 158. Defendant breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and Class members
22 by failing to sufficiently encrypt or otherwise protect Plaintiff's and Class members'
23 PII.

1 159. Defendant also breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and Class
2 members by failing to diligently discover, investigate, and give notice of the Data
3 Breach in a reasonable and practicable period.

4 160. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its fiduciary
5 duties, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered and will continue to suffer
6 numerous injuries (as detailed *supra*).

7 **SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
8 **Violation of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL)**
9 **Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.***
 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

10 161. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
11 forth herein.

12 162. Defendant engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices in
13 violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.* which prohibits unlawful, unfair,
14 or fraudulent business acts or practices ("UCL").

15 163. Defendant's conduct is unlawful because it violates the California
16 Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Civ. Code § 1798.100, *et seq.* (the "CCPA"), and
17 other state data security laws.

18 164. Defendant stored the PII of Plaintiff and the Class in its computer
19 systems and knew or should have known it did not employ reasonable, industry
20 standard, and appropriate security measures that complied with applicable
21 regulations and that would have kept Plaintiff's and the Class's PII secure to prevent
22 the loss or misuse of that PII.

23 165. Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiff and the Class that their PII was
24

1 not secure. However, Plaintiff and the Class were entitled to assume, and did assume,
2 that Defendant had secured their PII. At no time were Plaintiff and the Class on
3 notice that their PII was not secure, which Defendant had a duty to disclose.

4 166. Defendant also violated California Civil Code § 1798.150 by failing to
5 implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, resulting in
6 an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of Plaintiff's and the
7 Class's nonencrypted and nonredacted PII.

8 167. Had Defendant complied with these requirements, Plaintiff and the
9 Class would not have suffered the damages related to the data breach.

10 168. Defendant's conduct was unlawful, in that it violated the CCPA.

11 169. Defendant's acts, omissions, and misrepresentations as alleged herein
12 were unlawful and in violation of, inter alia, Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
13 Commission Act.

14 170. Defendant's conduct was also unfair, in that it violated a clear
15 legislative policy in favor of protecting consumers from data breaches.

16 171. Defendant's conduct is an unfair business practice under the UCL
17 because it was immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous and caused
18 substantial harm. This conduct includes employing unreasonable and inadequate
19 data security despite its business model of actively collecting PII.

20 172. Defendant also engaged in unfair business practices under the
21 "tethering test." Its actions and omissions, as described above, violated fundamental
22 public policies expressed by the California Legislature. *See, e.g.*, Cal. Civ. Code §
23 1798.1 ("The Legislature declares that . . . all individuals have a right of privacy in

1 information pertaining to them . . . The increasing use of computers . . . has greatly
2 magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that can occur from the
3 maintenance of personal information.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(a) (“It is the
4 intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about California
5 residents is protected.”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22578 (“It is the intent of the
6 Legislature that this chapter [including the Online Privacy Protection Act] is a matter
7 of statewide concern.”). Defendant’s acts and omissions thus amount to a violation
8 of the law.

9 173. Instead, Defendant made the PII of Plaintiff and the Class accessible to
10 scammers, identity thieves, and other malicious actors, subjecting Plaintiff and the
11 Class to an impending risk of identity theft. Additionally, Defendant’s conduct was
12 unfair under the UCL because it violated the policies underlying the laws set out in
13 the prior paragraph.

14 174. As a result of those unlawful and unfair business practices, Plaintiff and
15 the Class suffered an injury-in-fact and have lost money or property.

16 175. For one, on information and belief, Plaintiff’s and the Class’s stolen PII
17 has already been published—or will be published imminently—by cybercriminals
18 on the dark web.

19 176. The injuries to Plaintiff and the Class greatly outweigh any alleged
20 countervailing benefit to consumers or competition under all of the circumstances.

21 177. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant’s
22 legitimate business interests, other than the misconduct alleged in this complaint.

23 178. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief,
24

1 including restitution of all monies paid to or received by Defendant; disgorgement
2 of all profits accruing to Defendant because of its unfair and improper business
3 practices; a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant's unlawful and unfair
4 business activities; and any other equitable relief the Court deems proper.

5 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
6 **Violations of the California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA")**
7 **Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150**
8 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

9 179. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
10 forth herein.

11 180. Defendant violated California Civil Code § 1798.150 of the CCPA by
12 failing to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
13 appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the nonencrypted PII of
14 Plaintiff and the Class. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiff's and the Class's
15 nonencrypted and nonredacted PII was subject to unauthorized access and
16 exfiltration, theft, or disclosure.

17 181. Defendant is a "business" under the meaning of Civil Code § 1798.140
18 because Defendant is a "corporation, association, or other legal entity that is
19 organized or operated for the profit or financial benefit of its shareholders or other
20 owners" that "collects consumers' personal information" and is active "in the State
21 of California" and "had annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million
22 dollars (\$25,000,000) in the preceding calendar year." Civil Code § 1798.140(d).

23 182. Plaintiff and Class Members seek injunctive or other equitable relief to
24 ensure Defendant hereinafter adequately safeguards PII by implementing reasonable

1 security procedures and practices. Such relief is particularly important because
2 Defendant continues to hold PII, including Plaintiff's and Class members' PII.
3 Plaintiff and Class members have an interest in ensuring that their PII is reasonably
4 protected, and Defendant has demonstrated a pattern of failing to adequately
5 safeguard this information.

6 183. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 1798.150(b), Plaintiff mailed a
7 CCPA notice letter to Defendant's registered service agents, detailing the specific
8 provisions of the CCPA that Defendant has violated and continues to violate. If
9 Defendant cannot cure within 30 days—and Plaintiff believes such cure is not
10 possible under these facts and circumstances—then Plaintiff intends to promptly
11 amend this Complaint to seek statutory damages as permitted by the CCPA.

12 184. As described herein, an actual controversy has arisen and now exists as
13 to whether Defendant implemented and maintained reasonable security procedures
14 and practices appropriate to the nature of the information so as to protect the personal
15 information under the CCPA.

16 185. A judicial determination of this issue is necessary and appropriate at
17 this time under the circumstances to prevent further data breaches by Defendant.

18 **EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
19 **Declaratory Judgment**
20 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

21 186. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if fully set
22 forth herein.

23 187. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, *et seq.*, this
24

1 Court is authorized to enter a judgment declaring the rights and legal relations of the
2 parties and to grant further necessary relief. The Court has broad authority to restrain
3 acts, such as those alleged herein, which are tortious and unlawful.

4 188. In the fallout of the Data Breach, an actual controversy has arisen about
5 Defendant's various duties to use reasonable data security. On information and
6 belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions were—and *still* are—inadequate and
7 unreasonable. And Plaintiff and Class members continue to suffer injury from the
8 ongoing threat of fraud and identity theft.

9 189. Given its authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act, this Court
10 should enter a judgment declaring, among other things, the following:

- 11 a. Defendant owed—and continues to owe—a legal duty to use
12 reasonable data security to secure the data entrusted to it;
- 13 b. Defendant has a duty to notify impacted individuals of the Data
14 Breach under the common law and Section 5 of the FTC Act;
- 15 c. Defendant breached, and continues to breach, its duties by failing
16 to use reasonable measures to the data entrusted to it; and
- 17 d. Defendant breaches of its duties caused—and continues to
18 cause—injuries to Plaintiff and Class members.

19 190. The Court should also issue corresponding injunctive relief requiring
20 Defendant to use adequate security consistent with industry standards to protect the
21 data entrusted to it.

22 191. If an injunction is not issued, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer
23 irreparable injury and lack an adequate legal remedy if Defendant experiences a

1 second data breach.

2 192. And if a second breach occurs, Plaintiff and the Class will lack an
3 adequate remedy at law because many of the resulting injuries are not readily
4 quantified in full and they will be forced to bring multiple lawsuits to rectify the
5 same conduct. Simply put, monetary damages—while warranted for out-of-pocket
6 damages and other legally quantifiable and provable damages—cannot cover the full
7 extent of Plaintiff and Class members' injuries.

8 193. If an injunction is not issued, the resulting hardship to Plaintiff and
9 Class members far exceeds the minimal hardship that Defendant could experience if
10 an injunction is issued.

11 194. An injunction would benefit the public by preventing another data
12 breach—thus preventing further injuries to Plaintiff, Class members, and the public
13 at large.

14 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

15 Plaintiff and Class members respectfully request judgment against Defendant
16 and that the Court enter an order:

- 17 A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of Plaintiff and the
18 proposed Class, appointing Plaintiff as class representative, and
19 appointing her counsel to represent the Class;
- 20 B. Awarding declaratory and other equitable relief as necessary to protect
21 the interests of Plaintiff and the Class;
- 22 C. Awarding injunctive relief as necessary to protect the interests of
23 Plaintiff and the Class;

- 1 D. Enjoining Defendant from further unfair and/or deceptive practices;
- 2 E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class damages including applicable
- 3 compensatory, exemplary, punitive damages, and statutory damages, as
- 4 allowed by law;
- 5 F. Awarding restitution and damages to Plaintiff and the Class in an
- 6 amount to be determined at trial;
- 7 G. Awarding attorneys' fees and costs, as allowed by law;
- 8 H. Awarding prejudgment and post-judgment interest, as provided by law;
- 9 I. Granting Plaintiff and the Class leave to amend this complaint to
- 10 conform to the evidence produced at trial; and
- 11 J. Granting other relief that this Court finds appropriate.

12 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

13 Plaintiff demands a jury trial for all claims so triable.

14
15 Dated: June 4, 2024

By: /s/ Andrew G. Gunem

16 Andrew G. Gunem (SBN 354042)
andrewg@straussborrelli.com
17 STRAUSS BORRELLI PLLC
One Magnificent Mile
18 980 N. Michigan Avenue, Ste. 1610
Chicago, IL 60611
19 Telephone: (872) 263-1100
20 Facsimile: (872) 263-1109

21 *Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed*
22 *Class*